The Vyāsa-Bhāṣya distinguishes dispositional imprints that cause memory and the Kleśas from karmic imprints that cause fruition. They can be directly perceived only together with their place, time, cause, and experience; this yields knowledge of one’s own and others’ previous births. The story of Jaigīṣavya illustrates that even heavenly experience counts as suffering when compared with kaivalya.

The Vyāsa-Bhāṣya interprets knowledge of another’s Citta as the result of saṃyama on a cognition (pratyaya):

• The yogin directs saṃyama toward the cognition associated with another mind.
• The state or content of that other Citta thereby becomes knowable.
• What is known first is the cognition itself, not automatically every object on which that cognition is based.

The following Sūtra, 3.20, states this limitation explicitly.

The Vyāsa-Bhāṣya limits the claim made in 3.19: the yogin may know, for example, that another person’s cognition is colored by attachment, but not what it is directed toward. The object of the other Citta was not itself the object of the yogin’s saṃyama.

Without tat, the sentence generally states that another person’s mental content is not known together with its support. PE1904 has an explicit backward reference through tat. The omission in PM2026 smooths the wording but barely changes the teaching; meter supplies no criterion.